Philosophy of history 07-17-74-01-88

TABLE OF CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

·         Meaning of philosophy of History

·         Historical background of Georg Wilhelm Friendrich Hegel

·         Methods of writing History

MAIN BODY

·         Summarization of philosophy of History by Georg Wilhelm Friendrich Hegel

CONCLUSION

REFERENCES

Philosophy of history, is the study either of the historical process and its development or of the methods used by historians to understand their material.The term history may be employed in two quite different senses, it may mean  the events and actions that together make up the human past, or it may mean the accounts given of that past and the modes of investigation whereby they are arrived at or constructed[1]. When used in the first sense, the word refers to what as a matter of fact happened, while when used in the second sense it refers to the study and description of those happenings.

The notion of philosophical reflection upon history and its nature is consequently open to more than one interpretation, and modern writers have found it convenient to regard it as covering two main types of undertaking. On the one hand, they have distinguished philosophy of history in the traditional or classical sense; this is conceived to be a first-order enquiry, its subject matter being the historical process as a whole and its aim being, broadly speaking, one of providing an overall elucidation or explanation of the course and direction taken by that process. On the other hand, they have distinguished philosophy of history considered as a second-order enquiry. Here attention is focused not upon the actual sequence of events themselves but, instead, upon the procedures and categories used by practicing historians in approaching and comprehending their material[2]. The former, often alluded to as speculative philosophy of history, has had a long and varied career; the latter, which is generally known as critical or analytical philosophy of history, did not rise to prominence until the 20^th century.

Hegel’s lectures on the philosophy of history are recognized in German as a popular introduction to his system; their form is less rigid than generality treatises and the illustrations, which occupy a large proportion of the work, are trains. Hegel argue that there are three methods of writing History and he distinguishing these three methods or modes of doing history as, Original History,

Firstly,Hegel argue that, Original history consists of an account of actions, events, and situations lived through and witnessed  by the historian. Other primary sources are used, but as "ingredients only",the account depends fundamentally on the historian's own witnessing of the times. Hegel cites Thucydides and Herodotus as examples. He also describes this type of recorded history as "history whose spirit (the historian) shared in," and notes that the primary task of "original history" is to create an internal, "mental representation" of external events. Original history must deal instead with the "observed and observable reality" of a people who are self aware and unique.

Further, original history cannot be of great external scope, it is a limited viewpoint, a portrait of the time. The original historian does not offer a great deal of theory about or reflection on the events and situations he or she recounts--"he lives within the spirit of the times and cannot as yet transcend them." For Hegel, the spirit in which the original historian is writing is the same as the spirit of the times he or she is writing about: "the spirit of the author and of the actions he tells of, are one and the same."[3]

Reflective History, This is the second historical method Hegel mentions. Reflective history is written after the time covered in the history has passed, and therefore it involves a remove at which the historian can analyze and interpret the events he covers. Reflective history is divided into four sub-methods: universal history, pragmatic, critical, and specialized.

Universal History, This is the first form of reflective history that Hegel sets out. Universal history seeks to provide an account of the whole history of a people, or even of the world. Unlike original history, the spirit in which a universal history is written is not the spirit of the times written about.[4] Since the extremely broad scope of universal history necessitates the intense compression of complex events into simple statements, the primary factor in such histories is the "thought" of the historian as he works to give a coherent, universal account.

Pragmatic History, Pragmatic history, the second type of reflective history, involves an ideology or interpretive method on the part of the historian, who uses historical events to back up a pointed argument. Hegel disdains pragmatic histories that seek to provide "moral lessons”

Critical History, This third type of reflective history seeks to re-interpret existing historical accounts. Critical history is a kind of history of history, which tests the accuracy of given accounts and perhaps poses alternative accounts.[5] Hegel dislikes this kind of history, which "extorts" new things to say from existing accounts. He points out that this is a cheaper way to achieve "reality" in history, because it puts subjective notions in place of facts and calls these notions reality.

Specialized History, This final type of reflective history focuses on one thread in history, such as "the history of art, of law, or of religion." At the same time, it represents a transitional stage to philosophic history because it takes a "universal viewpoint." The very focus taken (e.g., the history of law) represents a choice on the part of the historian to make a universal concept the guiding rationale for his or her specific history. If the specialized history is good, the author will give an accurate account of the fundamental "Idea" (the "inner guiding soul") that guided the particular events and actions discussed.[6]

Philosophic History, The focus of this third major category of history is the larger process by which Spirit unfolds in the world as history (this is, of course, Hegel's own historical method). Philosophic history prioritizes thought before history, bringing pure philosophical ideas to bear on events. The thoughts that organize the "raw material" of historical events into philosophic history come first and can stand alone--they are a priori. Thus, the philosophic historian studies both the eternal Spirit (which is non-temporal) and the historical process which is its unfolding (a process which is temporal).

The philosophy history as paused by George Frederick Hegel, philosopher and historian and historian has often been viewed as largely technological. It has often been speculated that this philosophical presumption arose from the historical context of Hegel’s life whether negatively from his dedication to the romantic thesis that reason shapes the universe none the less Hegel’s commitment to the dialectical progression of time and to the triumphant end of history is taken to be a largely deterministic and a historical philosophy, such as a reading, I would argue would be a mistaken.

Hegel’s task becomes even more difficult by the question of where to search for his “truth” as philosopher  of history, Hegel concern are primary focused upon the finding basis truths regarding the nature of reality[7]. Because he seeks metaphysical “first principles of nature his results con not judged through outside sources or objective facts, but only through individual reflection and inspiration in contract the philosopher of history is expected to rely almost wholly upon facts and to avoid the contamination of “bias” conclusions about the historical meaning follow not from preconceived no twins but from facts and connection discovered from historical events alone. The chasm separating these two approaches could hardly be more dramatic.

State of nature to be in actual experience answers exactly to the idea of a merely natural conditions freedom as the ideal of that which is original and natural does not exist as original and nature. Rather must it be first sought out and won and that by an in callable medical discipline of the intellectual and moral powers. The state of nature is therefore predominantly that of injustice and violence, of untamed natural impulses fin human deeds and feelings a contrivance for calling the members of the state together for taking the votes and for performing the arithmetical operations of reckoning and comparing the numbers of the state together for taking the voters and for the  different propositions and thereby deeding upon them the state is an abstraction having even its generic existence in its simply generic existence but it is an actuality and its simply generic existence must embody itself  in individual will and activity.[8]

The legal foundation of the state (the constitution) in a constitution the main feature of interest is the self-development of the rational that is the political condition of a people; the setting free of the decisive dements of the idea so that the several powers in the state manifest themselves as separate attain their appropriate and special perfection and yet in this independent condition work together for one object and are held together  from organic whole the state is thus the embodiment of rational freedom, realizing and recognizing itself in an objective form.

The state is the idea of spirit in the external manifestation of human will and its freedom. It is to the state therefore that change in the aspect of history indissolubly attaches itself and the successive phases of the ideal manifest themselves the constitutions under which worked historical political principles the constitutions under which world historical people have reached their collimation are peculiar to them; and therefore do not present a generally application political bios were it otherwise the differences of similar constitutions would consist only in a peculiar method of expanding and developing that generic basis, where as they really originated in diversity of principle.[9]

The mental and moral condition of individuals and their social and religious conditions (the subjective and objective manifestation of reason) exhibit a strict correspondence with each other in every grade of progress they that make them are the like into them” is as true of religious and political ideas as of religious and political idols where man sets no value on that part of his mental and moral life which makes him superior to the brutes, brute life will be an object of worship and bestial sensuality will be the genius of the ritual.

The inward or ideal transition, from Egypt to Greece is as just exhibited but Egypt became a province of the great person kingdom, and the historical transition takes place where the Persian worked comes in contact with the Greek. Here  for the first time an historical transition meet us, vise in the fall of an empire china and idea as already mentioned have remain. Persia has not due transition to Greece is indeed, internal but here it shows itself also externally as a transmission of sovereignty-an occurrence which from this time forward is ever and an on repeated for the Greeks surrender the scepter of dominion and of civilization to the Romans, and the Romans are subdued by the Germans. It we examine this fact of transition more closely the question suggests itself for example, in this first case of the kind, verse Persia why it sank, while china and India remain[10].

It must be observed at the outset, that the phenomenon we investigate-universal history belong to the phenomenon we investigate universal history belongs to the realm of spirit the term “world” includes both physical and physical nature. Physical nature also plays its part in the world’s history and attention will have to be paid to the fundamental natural relations thus involved. But spirit and the course of its development, is our substantial object[11]. Our task does not require us to contemplate nature as a rational system in itself-through in it’s our proper domain it proves itself such but simply in its relation to splint. On the stage on which we are observing it universal history-split displays itself in its most concrete reality. Notwithstanding this (or rather for the very purpose of comprehending the general principles which this, its form of concrete reality, embodies) we must premise some abstract characteristics of the nature of spirit. Such an explanation however cannot be given here under any other farm than that of bare assertion. The present is not the occasion for unfolding the ideal of spirit speculatively, for whatever has a place in an introduction, must as already observed, be taken a simply historical; something assumed as having been explained and proved elsewhere; or whose demonstration awaits the sequel of the science of history itself. We have therefore to mention here. The abstracts characteristics of the nature of spirit and what means spirit uses in order to realize its ideal.

In generally George Frederick Hegel as philosopher and historian as often been viewed as largely ideological he discovered different philosophy in history during the ancient time where by different society for state or become a state due to various factors like state of nature to be in actual also researching about the truth and reality of the nature. Hegel concerns are primary focused upon the finding basic truth regarding the nature of reality has a philosopher  try to investigate about the truth and reality of the nature due to the fact that state from spirit in ward of transition from Egypt to Greece.

       

REFERENCE

Avineri, Shlomo, 1972, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge: Cambridge.

                             University Press. 

Beiser, Frederick C. (ed.), 2008, The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-

                               Century Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Brandom, Robert B., 2009, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, Cambridge, Mass.:

                                  Harvard University Press.

Bristow, William F. 2007, Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique, Oxford:

                                   Oxford University Press.

Ferrarin, Alfredo, 2001, Hegel and Aristotle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Forster, Michael N., 1989, Hegel and Skepticism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1976, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, P. Christopher  

                                     Smith (trans.), New Haven: Yale University Press. 

http://www.historicalinsights.com/dave/hegel.html accessed on Sunday at 02:20 pm   (2015 )

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Philosophy of history 07-67-27-19-87

Philosophy of history, is the study either of the historical process and its development or of the methods used by historians to understand their material.

The term history may be employed in two quite different senses, it may mean  the events and actions that together make up the human past, or it may mean the accounts given of that past and the modes of investigation whereby they are arrived at or constructed. When used in the first sense, the word refers to what as a matter of fact happened, while when used in the second sense it refers to the study and description of those happenings.

The notion of philosophical reflection upon history and its nature is consequently open to more than one interpretation, and modern writers have found it convenient to regard it as covering two main types of undertaking. On the one hand, they have distinguished philosophy of history in the traditional or classical sense; this is conceived to be a first-order enquiry, its subject matter being the historical process as a whole and its aim being, broadly speaking, one of providing an overall elucidation or explanation of the course and direction taken by that process. On the other hand, they have distinguished philosophy of history considered as a second-order enquiry. Here attention is focused not upon the actual sequence of events themselves but, instead, upon the procedures and categories used by practicing historians in approaching and comprehending their material. The former, often alluded to as speculative philosophy of history, has had a long and varied career; the latter, which is generally known as critical or analytical philosophy of history, did not rise to prominence until the 20th century.

Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel was a German philosopher, and a major figure in German Idealism. His historicist and idealist account of reality revolutionized European philosophy and was an important precursor to Continental philosophy and Marxism.  Born: August 27, 1770, Stuttgart, Germany

Spirit  -  This is the central concept in Hegel's method of philosophic history. The concept of Spirit unifies the three concepts of freedom, Reason, and self- consciousness, which are interdependent almost to the point of identity. Freedom is simply total self-sufficiency, and self-consciousness is absolutely necessary to the sense of freedom Hegel is getting at. Universal Reason is the only true context for this true freedom, because only Reason is truly self- sufficient--it doesn't depend on anything but itself.. Specifically, Spirit unfolds in a series of stages (each of which is a unique spirit of a historical people, embodied in a State), The only interest of Spirit is to realize its own principle of true freedom, and it does this by unfolding as human history, where the consciousness of universal, rational freedom is the driving force. Hegel's metaphor for Spirit is a seed, which contains all it will become within itself but which also needs to see those contents actualized in the world.

Hegel believed and argues, that we do not perceive the world or anything in it directly and that all our minds have access to is ideas of the world thus images, perceptions, concepts. The only reality we know is a virtual reality. Hegel’s idealism differs from Kant’s in two ways. First, Hegel believed that the ideas we have of the world are social, which is to say that the ideas that we possess individually are utterly shaped by the ideas that other people possess. Our minds have been shaped by the thoughts of other people through the language we speak, the traditions and mores of our society, and the cultural and religious institutions of which we are a part.

The second way that Hegel differs from Kant is that he sees Spirit as evolving according to the same kind of pattern in which ideas might evolve in an argument, namely the dialectic. First, there is a thesis, an idea or proposition about the world and how we relate to it. Every thesis, or idea about the world, contains an inherent contradiction or flaw, which thus gives rise to its antithesis, a proposition that contradicts the thesis. Finally, the thesis and antithesis are reconciled into a synthesis, a new idea combining elements of both.

Essentially, Hegel sees human societies evolving in the same way that an argument might evolve. An entire society or culture begins with one idea about the world, which naturally and irresistibly evolves into a succession of different ideas through a dialectical pattern. Since Hegel believes that this succession is logical, meaning that it could only happen one way, he thinks that we can figure out the entire course of human history without recourse to archaeology or other empirical data, but purely through logic.

Spirit does not exist from the earliest moments of human history but is instead a modern phenomenon toward which humanity had to evolve but human consciousness starts from a position of trying to grasp objects through sensory inputs and moves on to more sophisticated Spirit is the self-consciousness of the community, the whole of which individuals are only a part. As the consciousness of spirit unfolds and changes, so do the values and actions of the individual parts of which it is made.

Ethical Life as the Expression of an Age, Ethical life is a given cultural expression of Spirit, the collective entity that transcends all individuals and determines their beliefs and actions whether they are aware of it or not. Ethical life reflects the fundamental interdependence among individuals in a society and finds articulation in their shared customs and morals.

 Hegel argues that the tendency in modern life characterized by economic individualism and the Enlightenment idea of the individual as a subject possessing various rights represents a movement away from the recognition of essential social bonds. Before the Enlightenment, human beings were generally considered in terms of how they fit into social hierarchies and communal institutions, but following Enlightenment thinkers such as Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, and Kant, the individual on his own came to be considered sacred. In the Philosophy of Right, Hegel explains that the modern state is the institution that will correct this imbalance in modern culture. Although economic and legal individualism play a positive role in modern society,

 Hegel foresees the need for institutions that will affirm common bonds and ethical life while preserving individual freedom. He believes, for example, that the state must regulate the economy and provide for the poor in society and that there should be “corporative” institutions, somewhat similar to modern trade unions, in which different occupational groups affirm a sense of social belonging and a feeling of being connected to larger society.

Hegel argue that there are  three methods of writing History and he distinguishing these three methods or modes of doing history as, Original History, Reflective History and Philosophical History,

Firstly,Hegel argue that, Original history consists of an account of actions, events, and situations lived through and witnessed  by the historian. Other primary sources are used, but as "ingredients only",the account depends fundamentally on the historian's own witnessing of the times. Hegel cites Thucydides and Herodotus as examples. He also describes this type of recorded history as "history whose spirit (the historian) shared in," and notes that the primary task of "original history" is to create an internal, "mental representation" of external events. Original history must deal instead with the "observed and observable reality" of a people who are self aware and unique.

Further, original history cannot be of great external scope, it is a limited viewpoint, a portrait of the time. The original historian does not offer a great deal of theory about or reflection on the events and situations he or she recounts--"he lives within the spirit of the times and cannot as yet transcend them." For Hegel, the spirit in which the original historian is writing is the same as the spirit of the times he or she is writing about: "the spirit of the author and of the actions he tells of, are one and the same."

Reflective History  -  This is the second historical method Hegel mentions. Reflective history is written after the time covered in the history has passed, and therefore it involves a remove at which the historian can analyze and interpret the events he covers. Reflective history is divided into four sub-methods: universal history, pragmatic, critical, and specialized.

Universal History  -  This is the first form of reflective history that Hegel sets out. Universal history seeks to provide an account of the whole history of a people, or even of the world. Unlike original history, the spirit in which a universal history is written is not the spirit of the times written about. Since the extremely broad scope of universal history necessitates the intense compression of complex events into simple statements, the primary factor in such histories is the "thought" of the historian as he works to give a coherent, universal account.

Pragmatic History  -  Pragmatic history, the second type of reflective history, involves an ideology or interpretive method on the part of the historian, who uses historical events to back up a pointed argument. Hegel disdains pragmatic histories that seek to provide "moral lessons”

Critical History  -  This third type of reflective history seeks to re-interpret existing historical accounts. Critical history is a kind of history of history, which tests the accuracy of given accounts and perhaps poses alternative accounts. Hegel dislikes this kind of history, which "extorts" new things to say from existing accounts. He points out that this is a cheaper way to achieve "reality" in history, because it puts subjective notions in place of facts and calls these notions reality.

specialized History  -  This final type of reflective history focuses on one thread in history, such as "the history of art, of law, or of religion." At the same time, it represents a transitional stage to philosophic history because it takes a "universal viewpoint." The very focus taken (e.g., the history of law) represents a choice on the part of the historian to make a universal concept the guiding rationale for his or her specific history. If the specialized history is good, the author will give an accurate account of the fundamental "Idea" (the "inner guiding soul") that guided the particular events and actions discussed.

Philosophic History  -  The focus of this third major category of history is the larger process by which Spirit unfolds in the world as history (this is, of course, Hegel's own historical method). Philosophic history prioritizes thought before history, bringing pure philosophical ideas to bear on events. The thoughts that organize the "raw material" of historical events into philosophic history come first and can stand alone--they are a priori. Thus, the philosophic historian studies both the eternal Spirit (which is non-temporal) and the historical process which is its unfolding (a process which is temporal).

Morality  -  Hegel uses the term "morality" (in contrast to "ethics") to denote the subjective form of duty to others (in contrast to a form of duty based on the universal principles of the State). Philosophic history generally excludes consideration of morals, ignoring the personal moral problems of world-historical individuals. The reason for this exclusion is that subjective morality, like subjective will, is essentially arbitrary unless it is linked to universal principles. True ethics arise only with the State, which makes a people free through voluntary adherence to common principles and laws. Some ancient cultures (Hegel mentions Chinese, Indian, and Homeric civilizations) have moral codes but not ethics.

Universality  -  The term "universal" is extremely wide-ranging in Hegel, but in general it denotes that which transcends the subjective and the particular. The nature and essence of Spirit in and of itself is universal, but universality is only one aspect of Spirit as it unfolds in the world. The opposite aspect is particularity, and the division between these two aspects is based on the division Spirit creates within itself as it becomes self-conscious (which involves the knowing of itself as an object rather than just a subject). The course of history is driven by the dialectic (the back-and-forth) between the universal and particular aspects of Spirit. These aspects are sometimes joined, when the State succeeds in unifying the particular, subjective wills of its citizens with the universal principle that is the common Spirit of the people. Universality, whether it is fully meshed with the particularities of culture or not, must be present in a culture before that culture can be considered a State (since the State is the practical embodiment of a universal national principle). Until this happens, true "history" has not begun for that culture. Universality is first introduced in a culture by thought, which rejects traditional, unconsidered ideas of duty in favor of universal, rational laws. Thus, human culture seeks to know itself in a universal context, even as Spirit seeks to know itself as an objective thing in the world.

Idea  -  "Idea" remains a somewhat unclear concept, and is often used nearly interchangeably with "Spirit." Hegel refers to Idea at one point as lying in "the innermost pit of Spirit," and in general he uses the term in the context of a summarized, effective form of the very loose concept of Spirit (almost as a practical, active version of Spirit). The Idea is what directly informs the universal principle of the State in its many forms, and when Hegel is discussing Reason, he often expands the term to "rational Idea" to imply that Reason is not only an abstract concept but also a driving force in human history. The Idea is also referred to as something Spirit has, as the thing it wants to realize in the world. This usage only points out the extent to which Idea and Spirit overlap, since Hegel also says that Spirit only seeks to realize itself.

State  -  The State is the form abstract Spirit "takes in actuality," the "material form" of the rational goal of Spirit. As such, the State is a union between the Idea (the universal principle of rational freedom) and human interests or passion (the particular, subjective wills of individuals). The State arises as the embodiment of the Spirit of a given people, which in turn represents one stage in the development of universal Spirit in the world. Hegel is emphatic that the State does not limit freedom (as the "negative freedom" or social contract model would have it), but only limits the basest aspects of arbitrary subjective will ("caprice"). The limitation of these elements does not check true freedom at all, and in fact such limitation is requisite for any true freedom to exist. Because the State provides the only possibility for universal rational freedom (which emphasizes individual choice in adhering to universal laws), its emergence also marks the beginning of history--no events have the proper historical import without the legal context of the State, and so no people without a State are the concern of history. It's also important to remember that the State refers to the "ethical totality" of a people and their culture, not just to the government.

Nature  -  Hegel discusses nature primarily as an opposing term to the State and the history whose material is the State. The course of nature throughout history is essentially cyclical--nothing truly new ever emerges (i.e., there are no new concepts or laws)--whereas history itself proceeds precisely as entirely new concepts and contents are brought forth by Spirit. Nature does not truly "develop" in the sense of progress toward perfection, though it does "bring forth new forms" of the same essential content. Hegel disparages the idea (promoted in part by Schlegel) of a "state of nature," in which pre-historic man is supposed to have lived in a naive, peaceful state with full knowledge of God. For Hegel, there is no such thing as a "natural" State, since the State necessitates universal concepts and culture. Human nature, without any self-conscious thought, is simply a matter of the basest subjective will or caprice. As Spirit moves humanity away from this state, it must struggle against its own subjective aspect to attain the universal. Spirit also opposes nature in the sense that the aims of Spirit can be temporarily frustrated or stymied by natural conditions--nature "impinges" on history in this sense, but the only substance of history is Spirit.

Dialectic  -  The dialectic is an important Hegelian concept that is only used a few times in the Introduction. It denotes a kind of progress-through-negation, in which Spirit destroys realizations of itself in order to rise again in a new and more fully realized form. This sense of dialectic is closely linked to the self-consciousness of Spirit--in knowing itself (the universal) as its own opposite (the subjective or particular), Spirit struggles against itself as it emerges in the world. The dialectic therefore helps to explain why rational history progresses through violent upheaval rather than through smooth transition.

Passion  -  Passion is Hegel's term for the subjective will as it occupies an individual completely. Someone's passion is their encompassing goal, the cause that defines them, and therefore a means to self-knowledge. The ideal for any State is to realize the union of these subjective passions with the universal principle on which the State is based.

World-Historical Individuals  -  This is Hegel's phrase for those individuals who play a major role in world history--people like Caesar or Napoleon. World-historical individuals benefit from the partial coincidence of their own subjective passions with the universal will of Spirit as it is expressed in the Spirit of the people. That people's Spirit is unconscious until it is brought to consciousness by the world-historical individual; thus, world-historical individuals serve to bring Spirit to a new stage of self-consciousness and help to establish a new State. These individuals are rarely (if ever) aware of universal Spirit itself, though they generally happen to know what the "next step" in the spiritual life of their people must be. They are also often morally dubious, a fact which Hegel claims lies outside the scope of philosophic history (since such issues concern subjective morality rather than universal ethical principles). Hegel therefore disparages any "psychological" analysis of world- historical individuals, seeing such analyses as little more than envious and spiteful musings.

Original history is like that of Herodotus and Thucydides, these are almost contemporaneous writings limited to deeds, events and states of society which they had before their very eyes and whose culture they shared.

Reflective history is written at some temporal distance from the events or history considered. However, for Hegel, this form of history has a tendency to impose the cultural prejudices and ideas of the historians' era upon the past history over which the historian reflects.

Philosophical history for Hegel, is the true way. Hegel maintains that with philosophical history the historian must bracket his own preconceptions and go and find the overall sense and the driving ideas out of the very matter of the history considered     

                                                    REFERENCE

·             Avineri, Shlomo, 1972, Hegel's Theory of the Modern State, Cambridge: Cambridge.

                             University Press. 

·             Beiser, Frederick C., 2002, German Idealism: The Struggle against Subjectivism, Cambridge,

                             Mass.: Harvard University Press.

·             Beiser, Frederick C. (ed.), 2008, The Cambridge Companion to Hegel and Nineteenth-

                               Century Philosophy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·             Brandom, Robert B., 2009, Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, Cambridge, Mass.:

                                  Harvard University Press.

·             Bristow, William F. 2007, Hegel and the Transformation of Philosophical Critique, Oxford:

                                   Oxford University Press.

·             Deligiorgi, Katerina (ed.), 2006, Hegel: New Directions, Chesham: Acumen.

·             Ferrarin, Alfredo, 2001, Hegel and Aristotle, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·             Forster, Michael N., 1989, Hegel and Skepticism, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

·             Gadamer, Hans-Georg, 1976, Hegel's Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies, P. Christopher   

                                     Smith (trans.), New Haven: Yale University Press.     

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# +255767-27-1987

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